Iran’s decision to launch approximately 200 ballistic missiles into Israel this week tells us two things. First, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was so concerned about the weakening of Tehran’s strategic position after weeks of Israeli operations against Hezbollah that he believed a direct attack on Israel was required to build back some of its deterrent. Second, Khamenei and his advisers are more worried than ever that after its proxy in Lebanon is degraded, Israel may look to cut off the head of the snake—the clerical regime in Tehran itself.
An Iranian missile attack on Israeli territory—even if the attack resulted in light damage—is liable to increase, not reduce, that prospect. The Iranian government gave Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a warning—If you retaliate, then expect more powerful strikes. Netanyahu, though, doesn’t view those statements as particularly convincing. “The regime in Iran does not understand our determination to defend ourselves and our determination to retaliate against our enemies,” Netanyahu said recently. “They will understand, whoever attacks us—we will attack him.”
The question isn’t whether Israel will retaliate but rather how.
Stringer/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images
Iran hawks in Israel and the United States are already offering up recommendations. Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett wrote on X that now is the perfect opportunity for Israel to finally wipe out Iran’s nuclear program. Matthew Kroenig, a foreign policy analyst for the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington, D.C., said the precisely the same thing. Ditto New York Times columnist Bret Stephens, who hinted that one of Iran’s major nuclear facilities in Isfahan should be on the target list.
The only problem—bombing Iran’s nuclear program is as ridiculous of a proposition today as it was when it was floated by John Bolton back in 2007.
A couple of questions need to be considered. First, is Israel capable of doing the job? While there’s no doubt the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have demonstrated their reach over the past year—just ask Hezbollah—much of Iran’s vast nuclear infrastructure is buried deep underground. At least a portion of Iran’s nuclear complex could be destroyed. But others would be left standing. Iran’s two main facilities, the Fordow and Natanz complexes where the most advanced centrifuges are located, might be impervious to the largest munition the U.S. has at its disposal. If the Americans can’t reach them from the air, it’s unlikely the Israelis will either. And if that turns out to be true, then the entire effort would nothing but a public relations campaign.
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that Israel could physically annihilate the program. That would be a tactical success. But how long would the success last? Unless all of Iran’s nuclear scientists were magically killed during the operation, Tehran would still preserve the knowledge it gained over more than two decades of nuclear work to rebuild at a time and pace of its choosing. Eliminating a structure is easy; eliminating knowledge is far more difficult.
Another question needs to be asked. Would bombing Iran’s nuclear program scare the Iranians into giving up on their nuclear pursuits? History is a guide; every time Israel has knocked out part of Tehran’s nuclear program through covert operations or cyberattacks, Iranian officials have retaliated by doubling down on it. This often includes limiting access to international inspectors, installing centrifuges that can churn out enriched uranium at a faster clip, and boosting their uranium stockpile. To take one example, when Israel destroyed a centrifuge facility in April 2020, the Iranians decided to replace it with a better-defended one in the Natanz complex.
Most important, military action would be totally counterproductive to the goal Israel ostensibly wants to achieve—a non-nuclear Iran. This may sound befuddling to some. How could bombing Iran’s nuclear program aid its advancement? Because notwithstanding Iran’s ongoing nuclear work, the U.S. intelligence community still assesses that Khamenei has yet to explicitly order the weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program. This conclusion was confirmed in the most recent worldwide threat assessment from America’s top intelligence official, Avril Haines, whose office wrote that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.”
At present, the cost of constructing a nuclear bomb still outweighs the benefits in Iran’s eyes. But this could easily change if Israel starts dropping munitions on Iran’s nuclear facilities. All reservations about taking the final step toward weaponization would likely go away. The mere fact that Israel was able to attack the program so blatantly would be the ultimate proof for Iran about why a nuclear deterrent is so highly valuable. This shouldn’t be a surprise to Israel, who in 1981 authorized a daring bombing raid to eliminate Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s Osirak nuclear reactor. Israel flattened the reactor but didn’t flatten Hussein’s thirst for a nuclear bomb. The work didn’t stop afterwards.
When asked on Oct. 2 whether he would support an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program, President Joe Biden replied “no.” It’s the right answer and one I hope he sticks to.
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune.
The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.
